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“The Ultra Peripheral Regions of the European Union: the case of the Canary Islands.”
The ultra peripheral regions, as they are known, within the European Union have a series of characteristics
that both identify them and clearly distinguish them from the rest of the European Union. From both a local
and a regional point of view, they are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects inherent in the process
of European integration. These areas have continually lobbied for express recognition of their singularities
for a long time. The process of defining the concept of their ultra peripheral status is closely related to the
dynamics of the very process of European integration, whilst, at the same time being heavily influenced by
the role these regions have traditionally played in world-wide geo-strategic designs.
The approach of this work is based on an analysis of the history and evolving definition of the concept of
"ultra peripheral region" within the European Union and the different factors that have had an influence on
the dynamics of the process: the framework for action and instruments that have been designed to tackle
the problems of these regions, with special emphasis being placed on the Canary Islands and, finally, the
current situation of these regions in the European Union.“THE ULTRA PERIPHERAL REGIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: THE CASE OF THE
CANARY ISLANDS”
I.-  DEFINING THE CONCEPT OF ULTRA PERIPHERICITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION.
The category of ultra-peripheral region is explicitly taken on board in the Treaty of Amsterdam. It includes
a series of territorial enclaves of the European Union (E.U.) that are clearly different from all other
Community territory, despite the fact that there are differences between the individual ultra-peripheral
regions
1. The differences between the ultra-peripheral regions and the rest are what enable us to draw up a
list of common characteristics for all of them, in comparison with the rest of the E.U.
The definition of this concept of being an ultra-peripheral region and, even more so, the international
recognition of this condition by the Union has not been an easy task. Right from the beginning, the E.U.
has used a different yardstick in treating the territories or enclaves that belonged to the different former
powers that made up the core of this regional block, compared with other territories and countries that
joined the Union at a later date. Some of these territories, having lost any chance of gaining independence
when the de-colonisation process originated and became generalised, remain part of the national territory
of the nation states that colonised them. Thus, these overseas territories, with their important geo-strategic
positions, joined the E.U. as the states they belonged to signed up to the Community process
2. It could be
said that a colonial heritage is the first common characteristic of all these E.U. ultra-peripheral territories,
which, furthermore, has determined a development model that has led to the structural deficiencies that
exist in these areas becoming enshrined. This prevents these regions, now E.U. regions, from participating
in the process of integration in the same conditions as all the other regions that make up the mosaic of the
E.U.
There are seven of these so-called “ultra-peripheral” regions: Guadeloupe, Guyana, Martinique and
Reunion (French overseas Departments), along with Azores, Madeira and the Canary Islands. The
European Union presently recognises a series of singular specific traits in these territories, which have
gradually given content to the term “ultra-peripheral”.
These regions are characterised by a limited range of resources and a high degree of extraversion and
dependency, making them extremely vulnerable to the vicissitudes of the international situation of themoment. One can not approach a study of these areas from the standpoint of a conventional economy. On
the contrary, the absence of economies of scale, constraints and limited diversification of resources and the
high cost of transport, as a consequence of the isolation and distance from markets, etc., are factors that
make in necessary to seek “unusual” alternatives for developing these regions. Furthermore, most of these
regions have high rates of population growth, which, when taken with the heavy dependence of their
economies on the tourist industry, which accounts for more than 50% of their GDP, puts a lot of pressure
on the resources and resource balance of these enclaves.
The ultra-peripheral regions are areas that are particularly affected by the perverse effects inherent in the
process of European integration. The pressure brought to bear on the Community, by these zones in order
to gain European recognition of their singularities has been continuous and dates back many years. The
process of defining the concept of being an ultra-peripheral region is closely related to the dynamics that
characterise European integration, whilst, at the same time, it is highly influenced by the role these areas
have traditionally played in the world-wide geo-strategic design.
Island territories have played an important role throughout history, as most were considered as strategic
enclaves for achieving different objectives, within the political agendas of the different powers. They have
been assigned different functions, for which they were specially apt, and depending on the interests being
pursued at any one time by their central governments. Traditionally, they have been seen as re-supply ports
for shipping, logistic support centres with military installations, sea traffic enclaves for providing adequate
control over trade routes, experimental areas for economic models that are later exported to other areas,
and even as nuclear experimental centres and radioactive waste disposal sites, etc.
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The reality of island life, however, was not assessed as a phenomenon in its own right until the second half
of the XX century. This was the fruit of the process of de-colonisation that would lead to the appearance
of a growing number of mini-states, which took on a renewed strategic importance in the bipolar dynamic
that characterised international relations at the time
4.
At the same time as island territories in general gained importance, a similar phenomenon was occurring in
the Community. The work carried out by the Council of Europe’s Conference on Local and Regional
Powers and the European Community’s Conference on the Peripheral Regions made a decisivecontribution, thanks to which, island territories would play an increasingly important and different role,
within the context of the so-called European peripheral regions
5
The Community integration process, both in the deepening and the widening aspects, also revealed the fact
that its very dynamic contained implicit polarising effects, which manifested themselves in an accentuation
of the inequalities between regions and, far from being corrected, they became accentuated
6. That is why
there is a need to implement corrective measures
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Despite the fact that the Community started to become aware of its internal problems in the seventies,
island regions were not given different treatment from the rest of the peripheral regions of the Community
until 1979
8. The starting point for island regions, as a completely different category in the European
political framework, was marked by the draft resolution on the specific problems of European Atlantic
regions (Azores, Madeira and the Canary Islands), which was presented during the 13
th session of the
Conference of Local and Regional Powers in 1978. Just as important as this resolution was the resolution
presented at the annual meeting of the European Communities’ Maritime Peripheral Regions, held in
Santiago de Compostela, in November 1979, in which the meeting voted unanimously in favour of creating
a Peripheral Islands Committee, within the Conference
9. The creation of this committee led to the first
Convention of the Peripheral Islands of the Conference of the Peripheral Maritime Regions being held on
Nuoro (Sardinia) in 1980.
Later on, and as a result of these meetings, the conference on island regions was held in Tenerife, in April
1981, under the auspices of the Conference of Local and Regional Powers of Europe. This conference was
declared “an important step towards a global and regular review of the economic and political problems of
European islands and archipelagos, the “most peripheral” of the peripheral regions”
10.
All these different elements led the Community to become increasingly aware that Community regional
policy, as it had been conceived thus far, did not allow for specific programmes or measures to be drawn
up for the less favoured island regions
11. But, furthermore, the change in the Community’s attitude
towards the reality of the situation of the islands must be considered as part of a general approach that
goes beyond merely becoming aware of the problems of island environments; it became part of a far more
ambitious programme aimed at establishing a medium term framework for development to enable each
region to overcome their structural deficiencies, using the range of measures in a “Community
Development Programme for Less Favoured Island Regions”
12.In the eighties, the Community became immersed in a major process of deepening. With the approval of
the Single Europe Act, the objective of creating a single internal market, including the concept of
economic and social cohesion, triggered a series of actions and measures that, in the case of the ultra
peripheral regions, signified the recognition of their singularities and the first manifestation of this was the
approval of the Programme of Specific Options for the French Overseas Departments (POSEIDOM).
The POSEIDOM action programme sought to provide a solution for these territories that took into
consideration both the regional characteristics of these areas and the fact that they were members of the
Community. The solution was based on two fundamental elements. On the one hand, on legal factors that
make it possible to face the specific problems of these regions, which cannot be solved by a uniform
application of Community law. And, on the other, a more active intervention with structural funds, which
was reinforced by the fact that this coincided with a profound reform of these funds.
In the early nineties, this EC initiative was complemented by the fact that the Programme of Specific
Options due to the Distance and Isolation of the Canary Islands (POSEICAN) and the Programme of
Specific Options due to the Distance and Isolation of Madeira and Azores (POSEIMA) were approved and
came into force. Along with POSEIDOM, this completed the “POSEI” initiatives of the Community,
aimed at facilitating the integration of the Canary Islands, Azores, Madeira and the French overseas
Departments in the single market, a priority Community objective.
In short, the aim of these programmes was to provide an EC political response to the special difficulties of
these regions, by adopting measures that are proportional to the effects of common policies, when these
are applied, and by designing a policy that showed solidarity with the effort of economic recuperation, with
a multi-disciplinary approach, and that was coherent and a catalyst for generating local development. It
was clear, however, that the political will of the Union alone is not enough to achieve these objectives,
they also require the support of local forces.
II.- THE CANARY ISLAND EXPERIENCE FROM THE PERIPHERY TO THE ULTRA-
PERIPHERYThe process of Canary Island integration in the European Union has shown characteristics of its own,
making it clearly different from the rest of Spain and from most other regions of Europe. A progressive
approach has been taken in the process. On the one hand advances have been made with caution and
mistrust and, on the other, with weaknesses that have translated into the dismantling of the traditional
special treatment that the Canary Islands have received since they became part of the Kingdom of Castille.
Although this argument is often used for informing public opinion and for justifying the core of
negotiations with the E.U., the Economic and Tax Regimen (REF) has been gradually dismantled, giving
way to a process of harmonisation, with modulations and transition periods, with European Union
legislation. Because of this, with the passage of time, far from attenuating regional differences, they are
being accentuated.
The process of incorporating the Canary Islands in the E.U. has been characterised by a lack of vision
concerning the essentially dynamic nature of the integration process. Other failings have been that this
situation was not taken into account when designing strategies for negotiating with Europe and a lack of a
medium and long term development plan to vertebrate the economy of the islands. This combination has
meant that the incorporation of the Canary Islands in the European project has suffered constant
adaptations and fixes. In the end there is a conflict of philosophies. On the one hand, the establishment in
the Canary Islands has tried to maintain their legacy of privileges from an earlier age and, on the other, a
growing harmonisation and homogenisation of everything European as a result of the widening and
deepening undergone by the process of European integration.
But, what are the characteristics that make the Canary Island experience so special? The case of the
Canary Islands can be divided into three stages:
a.- A first stage that corresponds to the time that Protocol number 2 of the Spanish Membership of the
European Communities Treaty.
b.-  A second stage, corresponding to the full integration of the Canary Islands in the Community.
c.-  And a third stage, with the Treaty of Amsterdam and the review of POSEICAN.
The possibility of Spain joining the European Community led to much debate in the Canary Islands, which
boiled down to three different options for the Islands in the face of Spain’s future membership:1. The Canary Islands remaining outside the European Community.
2. Integration with specificities.
3. Full integration.
The first and third options were rapidly discarded, and the second option is the one that carried the day in
the end. Right from the beginning in the Canaries, formulas were sought that would maintain the
differential status of the Islands in comparison with the mainland, either by negotiating specific clauses, or
by a special membership protocol for the Canary Islands. In the early stages the people of the Canary
Islands were not very involved in the debate and the studies carried out sought to justify a decision that, in
the end, was essentially political, rather than merely economic, given the confrontation and lack of
consensus between the interests at stake.
The opinion was deliberately spread that Canary Island integration in the Community would enable the
region to break the log-jam of its development process. Joining under Option 2 was presented as the
formula for extending the privileged relations the Islands had had thus far with the mainland, to the whole
of the European Community, thus gaining a larger market with special treatment. This view contains no
novelties, the continuist view rules, in which “supposedly” all economic sectors would benefit, achieving a
consensus that lasted very little time at all.
All in all, the Canary Island’s European Community membership document
13 was not substantially different
from what had been proposed and adopted by the Canary Island Parliament. The only thing missing was
complete freedom of trade between the Canary Islands and the Community, something to be expected. The
Canary Islands remained outside of the pillars that underpin the process of European integration: outside
the Customs Union (Non application of Common Trade Policy), out of the Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP) and Fisheries Policy (CFP) and out of the scope of application of Value Added Tax (VAT). In
short, “political integration”, as it was known at the time, was chosen, rather than “economic integration”,
which in Community terminology can be translated as “non-integration”. Therefore, the treatment given to
the Canary Islands was that of a third country with preferential treatment similar to the treatment given to
certain non-member countries by the European Community. Very shortly, however, this model started to
show signs of having reached its limit.On the one hand, there was a growing confrontation with opposing interests, within Canary Island society;
especially after seeing that the alleged advantages of the model for all sectors involved did not exist. The
special regimen proved prejudicial, largely due to commercial difficulties between the Canary Islands and
the rest of Spain, where, as a part of the Customs Union, access was more highly regulated than before
Spain joined the EC, whilst remaining the traditional market for Canary Island exports. All in all, and with
a view to the future, these problems, far from being palliated, would have become worse once the
transitional period came to an end, because of the static nature of Protocol 2, the potential or desired
evolution of the different sectors of the Canary Island economy and, above all, because of the single
market within the European Community. This was obvious in the case of quotas based on traditional
export volumes that, together with the Community’s external protection mechanisms,  proved to be a curb
on the necessary restructuring and growth of Canary Island production, limiting exports and local
production. One should not forget that the Community’s commercial policy with the Canary Islands made
it very clear that the objective was to maintain traditional trading flows from the Canary Islands to the
Community. No mention was made of progressively increasing them.
“Non integration” in mainstream Community policies led to Canary Island products being considered as
extra-Community and in some cases, they were treated worse than some products from third countries, as
was the case of Morocco, which competed directly with some of the Islands’ export products.
Thus, the entire primary sector was severely jeopardised (including export agriculture) and the industrial
sector was subjected to rules of origin and quotas, despite presenting structural weaknesses in the
economy of the Islands. The major beneficiary of this membership protocol was the services sector, which
was able to intensify its European connections within the framework of Protocol 2, and continue to benefit
from Community refunds which now spread to include mainland production and, in short, could continue
to operate on the same terms as before joining the EC, strengthening its position in comparison with the
rest of the economy.
On the other hand, Community evolution highlighted the deficiencies of Protocol 2. The Community
dynamic, immersed in creating the single market, clashed with the static character of the Canary Islands’
membership protocol, which, unless modification was to be considered, could aspire to no more than
minor adjustments and to reducing the chances of really becoming part of the European project. What is
more, the principle of economic and social cohesion that was introduced with the Single Europe Act,meant that the E.U. could treat certain territories differently, with a less stringent application of Common
Policies in these regions. So, the launching of POSEIDOM opened the way for establishing other
Programmes whose special characteristics made them necessary, such as Azores, Madeira and the Canary
Islands.
In 1989, an application was made to the European Communities for a change in status for Canary Island
membership, with a proposal being made for full integration with specificities. In 1990, the Commission
ruled in favour of the application and in June 1991, the second stage can be formally said to have started.
This stage was characterised by the full incorporation of the Canary Islands in the European Communities.
They became Community territory on joining the Customs Union, and Mainstream Common policies were
applied, although there were a series of transitional periods (for full application of Common Commercial
Policy), specificities and modulations (of a temporal nature and subject to review) in the application of
mainstream policies. The aim of these was to enable the Canary Island region to become a full member of
the single market dynamic, in the medium term, in the same conditions as the other regions of Europe.
The second stage was built on the foundation of the POSEICAN Programme
14. This was based on the fact
that the Canary Islands were structurally backward, and this was aggravated by a set of geographic
constraints that had a serious negative impact on social and economic development. Starting with the need
for economic and social cohesion that must come with the creation of the single market, a reinforced
application of structural funds is implemented and an express Community initiative for the ultra-peripheral
regions is taken on board (REGIS). The particularities of the Canary Islands are also recognised in the
application of common policies, which, in the case of the CAP, are articulated around two objectives. One
the one hand, to guarantee a supply of basic farm products essential for consumption and processing
(Specific Supply Regimen – REA from its initials in Spanish). This works in the following way: each year,
the Commission, through its management committees, approves a provisions supply plan for certain
agricultural produce for human consumption and local processing. Produce imported from third countries
as part of their fixed quotas is completely exempt from customs duties, whereas Community imports
receive a grant that is equivalent to the profit made from the import duties exemption. On the other hand,
measures are adopted, aimed at providing support for internal production, marketing and processing of
agricultural produce.
15Concerning the Common Fisheries Policy, it is applied in a somewhat particular manner in the Canary
Islands. A programme of grants has been established to off-set over-costs derived from its status of ultra-
peripheral region, marketing and processing grants for certain products and for farm produce, like the
REA, and the temporary suspension of the common customs duty for certain products.
In fiscal policy, and more specifically in the area of indirect taxation, there are important differences. The
Canary Islands are outside the area in which VAT is applied, although the Community brought pressure to
bear on the Canary Islands to review the REF in 1991 and introduce the General Canary Island Indirect
Tax (IGIC from its initials in Spanish). The structure of this tax is very similar to that of VAT, but with
lower rates of taxation. Furthermore, the Community Directives on special taxes (tobacco, hydrocarbons,
alcohol and alcoholic drinks) are not applied. Finally, concerning the dismantling of certain fiscal measures
intended to protect local industrial production, and the definitive implementation of the Common Customs
Duty, a transition period has been established for its gradual application and the dismantling of the former,
which finishes in the year 2001.
The final stage of the experience of the Canary Islands in the E.U. is the struggle to achieve express
recognition in the Treaty of ultra-peripheral regions and their definition. It is true that the common
declaration taken on board in the Treaty of Maastricht was a major step forward in the fight for
recognition of the singularities of these regions, especially with regard to the need for a modulated
application of common policies
16. But it is also true that the common declaration left major gaps in the
definitive consolidation of the ultra-peripheral regions in the heart of the Union, and that this could only be
achieved via the articles of the Treaty, which include the specific concept of ultra-peripheral status, the
enclaves considered ultra-peripheral and the acceptance of specific treatment in matters of economic
policy, for these regions.
The changes that have occurred on the international scene; the prospects of extending the E.U. to the east,
the major deepening process the E.U. is going through; are just some of the factors that have had an
influence on the political opportunity of demanding sufficient legal support for the idea of ultra-peripheral
status, from the Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC) that opened in Turin.
To this end, at the Funchal meeting of March 1996, the representatives of the ultra-peripheral regions
reiterated the political will stated at the ICG meeting in Turin. They called for the characteristics andspecificities of these areas to be taken into account as differentials, within the vector of ultra-peripheral
status defined in the Treaty of Maastricht. In short they were seeking for the position of these regions to be
defined before the Union was enlarged with the incorporation of former Eastern block countries. This way,
they hoped to prevent the singularity of the concept of ultra-peripheral status being put in doubt compared
to the relative position of other Community territories, so that the increase in the degree of homogeneity
that will accompany this process does not endanger the advances obtained over the last twenty years in the
definition and limitation of this term.
In October 1996, the declaration received the backing of a declaration made in the 24
th General Assembly
of the CPMR held in Puerto de la Cruz (Tenerife). This stressed the need to reinforce the concept of ultra-
peripheral status, the need to put measures in place to adapt Community policies to the reality of the
regional situation, define the special conditions for applying the Treaty of Maastricht that will meet the
needs of economic development, and to include environment-related problems in the framework of the
Union’s co-operation policy
17.
The aim of this was to establish particular measures and special conditions for applying common policies,
which is why both the media and politicians refer to it as the search for a “Permanent Statute”. This
obviously and undoubtedly leads to confusion and mistakes, especially if we consider what was finally
taken on board after the meeting of Amsterdam, and after overcoming the opposition of countries like
Germany, Sweden and Great Britain. Although they did not manage to have a Protocol introduced, as they
sought to, they did gain a clear legal base for measures in favour of the ultra-peripheral regions.  Article
158 (formerly 130 A) and article 299.2 (formerly article 227.2) of the Treaty of Amsterdam, which came
into force on the 1
st of May of this year
18, signify the recognition of the ultra-peripheral regions and their
specificities, but any economic policy decisions that are taken, based on these circumstances, may not go
against the coherence and integrity of Community legislation, or breach the single market or common
policies.
III.-  PENDING MATTERS AND UNCERTAINTIES.
At this moment in time, the Canary Islands are maintaining several negotiating fronts open in the E.U.
Some of these are not new ones, but rather cover unresolved areas. These are: the subject of CommonMarket Organisation (OCM) for bananas, the so-called Special Canary Island Zone (ZEC from its initials
in Spanish) and the re-negotiation of the POSEICAN programme, based on article 299.2 of the Treaty.
Concerning the OCM for bananas, the situation is a delicate one. Ever since creating this OCM was
considered, it has come under major pressure to have it dismantled from both inside and outside the
European Union. The critics from within the Union, headed by Germany, have weakened the negotiating
position on the other battle front; the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Ever since the regulations
covering this OCM came into force complaint after complaint has been presented to GATT, which, once
the WTO had been created, are reconsidered by a group of countries headed by U.S.A. as they considered
the regimen to be discriminatory. The first OCM ruling was negative, which led the E.U. to modify it as it
had to come into force on the 1
st of January of this year, at the latest. But complaints were presented
against the new OCM as well, and this time accompanied by threats from the U.S.A. to apply unilateral
trade sanctions. Once again, the OCM ruling was negative for the E.U. and the Union is presently
negotiating with the parties concerned, including the U.S.A., to re-design the OCM
19.
With respect to fiscal matters, the negotiation of the specificities of the Canary Islands in Europe have been
marked by bad political timing when these were mooted, and by inadequately designed measures being
proposed. This is where lack of attention to the dynamic of the process of European integration can be
most clearly seen. This has meant that the process has been approached in an inadequate manner, thus
weakening the position of the Canary Islands and the Spanish State in the negotiations.
The economic bases of the new REF were published in 1994, substituting the 1972 regimen. The new
bases established the so-called Special Canary Island Zone (ZEC), together with a series of “state aids”,
but the Commission were not informed of these in time or in the mandatory way. This has led to a late
negotiating process, and to the modification of the REF on two occasions. Finally it was decided to
separate the ZEC negotiations from the other measures included in the REF.
In late 1997 the Commission approved a series of grants for the REF, with time limits, to promote the
regional development of the Canary Islands. In its opinion, the Commission made it very clear that if the
Spanish authorities wish to extend the regimen, they must formally notify the Commission of this fact
20.
The package of aid approved is valid for a given period of time, some measures are applicable up to the
year 2003 and others up to the year 2005. In the case of operating aid, these are gradually reduced overtime and, at the time of re-negotiating them, if the Canary Islands no longer meets the criteria used by the
Commission for considering the Islands a region with abnormally low living standards, then they would no
longer be eligible  for this kind of aid. In the case of investment aid, as the Islands are an ultra-peripheral
region, an extension of this kind of aid would be feasible.
At the present time, the government is arguing that it is time to put the matter of the ZEC to one side and
to discuss it when the debate starts on the whole package of measures that must be adopted in accordance
with section 2 of art. 229 of the Treaty. So far, the authorities have clearly been politically incapable of
defending the ZEC, which has been watered down time and time again by the Commission. Neither the
national nor the regional authorities have been able to defend the criteria and the advantages that were so
strongly stressed when they were presented to Canary Island society as the backbone of the future model
of development for the Islands in 1994 (five years ago now). The worst aspect of all this is that with no
arguments being put by the regional or national government in support of what was supposed to be the
“only hope” for the Canary Island economy, no alternative strategy has been considered
21.
As we mentioned above, the partial approval of the REF left out the ZEC part, which, in the view of the
European Commission, has serious deficiencies. Furthermore, the Special Zone proposal is being
considered at a time of growing global instability and when advances in the Monetary Union are leading
Community institutions to state that they have the political will to move forward in the process of fiscal
harmonisation. In the Union, fiscal measures that imply a rate of taxation that is considerably below the
general level are considered pernicious. In fact, these practises are classed as unfair fiscal competition that
go against the principle of the single market. A ZEC in which priority was initially given to financial
services and in which companies paid 1 per cent taxes does not seem very feasible at the moment.
Concerning the matter of a statute for the ultra-peripheral regions, one must not forget that POSEIDOM,
POSEIMA and POSEICAN are programmes aimed at regulating the modulated application of common
policies in certain regions. In none of these cases is modulation supposed to be indefinite. In the end, the
application of common policies must lead to their full application in some cases, and a Community
assessment of the situation in others, to see whether there are objective conditions for continuing to
implement some form of modulation in the application of these common policies.This fact, together with the negotiating fronts that the Canary Islands have opened with the Union, have
undoubtedly created a large degree of uncertainty, both from the standpoint of the political negotiations
and from the standpoint of the economic partners concerned, which is far more serious. They do not know
if there are going to be substantial changes made to the context that is their reference point for mid and
long term planning. This has led to an increase in speculation and opportunism in search of short term
profits that constitute a high cost for regions as fragile as these are.
At the European Council held in Cologne on the 3
rd and 4
th of June this year, the Commission were asked
to present a report on the package of measures to be implemented in accordance with section 2 of article
229 of the Treaty, with respect to the ultra-peripheral regions, before the end of this year.
To this end, the review and replacement of current programmes must take into account two fundamental
aspects. On the one hand, the top priority objective must be to provide a backbone for economic activity in
these regions, which must involve a revaluation of local production and its effective connection with the
tourist industry. On the other had, it is essential that any approach is based on the general principle of
sustainable development, which acquires strategic importance in the setting of the ultra-peripheral regions,
most of which are islands, with highly fragile environments
22.
The starting point must be to recognise the limitations of these enclaves. But, at the same time, one must
seek out the differential aspects or factors that are being valued in the general view, and integrate them as a
development factor. The Islands have interesting and innovative axes on which to base future development.
They have a unique cultural and natural heritage and exceptional human resources, especially from the
point of view of creativity. This is traditionally associated with the relatively greater difficulties to be found
in many aspects of life in these areas, leading to certain skills being developed by the people who live here.
Traditionally, these skills have been lost when their potential has not been harnessed because of the
remoteness of these territories, making it very difficult to keep in contact with modern techniques and
procedures and to introduce these into the immediate surrounds. That is why it is necessary for the
competent authorities to make an extra effort in the field of education and research, to generate a
revaluation of the skills, attitudes and know-how that can articulate the two levels of man and his
environment. Thus, by conserving local identities and striking an adequate balance between economic
activity, social participation and environmental conservation, it is possible to achieve suitable insertion at
both the community and global levels.Finally, it may seem a paradox that, precisely when the European project has taken a decisive step in the
deepening process with Monetary Union and its third phase coming into force with the single currency
(EURO), a series of problems starts to appear like dark clouds on the horizon of the European Union’s
present and future.
In the final years of this decade, the E.U. is going through one of the worst crises of its history. It is not
the first time that the process of integration has run into difficulties, but when this has happened in the past,
the solution has been to slow down the deepening process and to seek a consensus between the different
forces in play. This time however, the deepening process has been accelerated and a political consensus is
more and more difficult.
In the face of the asymmetrical effects of globalisation, the European Union does not seem to provide any
form of protection to prevent these effects appearing in Member States and regions
23. On the contrary, the
deepening process reinforces these effects as they filter into the levels of analysis (world wide, regional,
national and local), which is why active policies at a local level are necessary to off-set the effects,
supported at national, regional and world-wide levels. This counter power is necessary to meet an
extremely asymmetric system. This also explains the need for political and economic devolution. This is a
vital point for the survival and development of ultra-peripheral regions. They need express representation
in the European Union, as a group with a set of characteristics that make them very different from the rest
of the Union. This would increase their autonomy over their own development model, integrating it and
giving it a central axis in order to overcome the traditional and pernicious dynamic of dependence and
replace it with one of inter-dependence
24.
At the present moment, we get the impression that the E.U. is in a panic, looking for a solution and what
remains to be seen is whether this panicked flight is a suicide mission that wrecks the project of “European
construction”. The step taken with the implementation of Monetary Union is bringing more pressure to
bear on the urgent need for a political definition of the European Union, which must be based on the pillar
of “de facto solidarity” between the diversity of peoples, groups and regions of which it is made up.TABLE Nº1
REGIONS Superficie(Km
2)   Population(Thousands)  Population Density
GUYANE 83.534 131,0 1,6
GUADELOUPE 1.705 413,0 242,0
MARTINIQUE 1.100 375,0 341,0
REUNION 2.512 652,0 260,0
ACORES 2.333 239,0 102,0
MADEIRA 795 254,0 320,0
CANARIAS 7.447 1535,0 206,0
Source: EUROSTAT
TABLE Nº2 UNEMPLOYMENT      RATES
REGIONS 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Change
 93-97
GUYANE na na 24,0 na na na 18,2 23,0 22,4 na 4,2
GUADELOUPE na na 31,1 na na na 24,0 26,1 29,3 na 5,3
MARTINIQUE na na 32,1 na na na 26,2 26,0 27,2 na 1,0
REUNION na na 36,9 na na na 31,7 34,3 36,8 na 5,1
FRANCE 9,6 9,3 8,7 9,0 10,0 11,2 12,2 11,3 12,0 12,0 1,0
ACORES 2,2 2,5 3,0 3,7 3,4 5,3 6,6 8,1 7,2 5,4 0,1
MADEIRA 4,8 5,5 5,0 3,0 3,0 3,7 4,6 4,8 5,5 5,4 1,7
PORTUGAL 6,0 4,8 4,1 3,6 3,8 5,3 6,7 7,3 7,4 6,7 1,4
CANARIAS 22,5 22,5 23,1 24,4 24,7 27,9 28,3 24,0 22,0 20,9 -7,0
ESPAÑA 20,.1 17,4 16,4 16,0 17,8 22,3 24,4 23,1 22,5 21,1 -1,2EUR 15 9,0 8,3 7,7 8,2 9,2 10,5 11,2 10,7 10,8 10,7 0,2
Source: EUROSTAT
TABLE Nº3 EMPLOYMENT
REGIONS   Employment 1997(thousands)   Employment 1997(%)  Employment rate(%)  GDP/Employed
Agricl. Indust. Service Total Agricl. Indust. Service 1988 1993 1997 1993 1996
GUYANE 3,0 4,0 33,0 44,0 7,8 10,0 82,2 .. .. .. 68 58
GUADELOUPE 10,0 24,0 90,0 124,0 7,8 19,7 72,5 .. .. .. 52 49
MARTINIQUE 9,0 12,0 102,0 123,0 7,5 9,7 82,8 .. .. .. 67 61
REUNION 8,0 24,0 128,0 160,0 5,1 15,1 79,8 .. .. .. 75 68
ACORES 15,0 19,0 57,0 91,0 16,0 21,2 62,8 60,1 59,6 58,5 52 57
MADEIRA 13,0 30,0 64,0 107,0 12,5 27,7 59,8 71,3 67,7 63,3 51 57
CANARIAS 44,0 93,0 384,0 521,0 8,4 17,8 73,8 44,3 41,0 47,6 105 97
EUR 15 7426 44036 97924 149386 5,0 29,5 65,6 61,0 60,7 60,9 100 100
Source: EUROSTATTABLE Nº4 GPD PER HEAD(in PPS)
REGIONS 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1993 1994 1995 1996
GUYANE 49 51 53 54 52 50 51 48 na na
GUADELOUPE 37 37 37 37 39 40 41 40 na na
MARTINIQUE 51 50 50 52 52 53 54 54 na. na
REUNION 43 43 45 47 48 46 47 46 na na
ACORES 43 45 43 44 46 48 49 50 50 50
MADEIRA 43 45 41 45 47 49 51 52 55 54
CANARIAS 73 72 71 72 73 74 76 75 75 74
EUR 15 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: EUROSTAT
Note. The period split into two subperiods to correspond with the two programing periods, 1989-93 and 1994 on.
For the second period, Eur 15 includes the new Länder
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